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Graham Ive’s central contribution to our methodological debate was his insistence on the firm as the 
analytical unit. Ive argues we should reject theories if the aspect of construction we are examining 
does not satisfy the assumptions of a particular theoretical model. We see this in his rejection of 
neoclassical economic theories in the two topics discussed in this paper: the adoption of innovations 
in construction; and microeconomic analysis as it relates to price determination in the market for 
construction. The former requires studying not just participants in the building process, but also 
participants in the innovation process, and the latter uses post-Keynesian pricing theory where 
prices are set according to mark-up procedures and vary with costs, but not directly with demand. 
This is in contrast to the general equilibrium, perfectly competitive price setting of neoclassical 
economics. Ive and his collaborators show a way towards better research in their emphasis on 
theory and the insistence that for building economics the analytical units are the industry and the 
firm, not the project. Ive’s concern is that the processes involved in organising the production of 
buildings should be seen as a distinctive and defining element of our analysis of the industry. 
 




This is a discussion of the methodology of construction economics and how the selection of theories 
imposes discipline on research. Across the research published by Graham Ive since the 1980s 
methodology has been a recurrent theme, and he has argued an important methodological problem 
in construction economics research is due to the acceptance of neo-classical microeconomics. That 
argument is the subject of this paper. 
 
Methodology is not an issue that features in the construction literature. There was a short debate on 
the merits of qualitative research following the publication of a paper by Seymour and Rooke (1995) 
and a subsequent paper by Seymour, Crook and Rooke (1997). Seymour and his colleagues 
maintained a positivist approach to construction management research is not appropriate because 
they see construction management as a sub-branch of management studies, or the study of human 
activities:  
The difficulty of doing management research is compounded because the discipline intends to 
produce advice for practitioners. This requires theorists to make value judgements, a process 
logically incompatible with the attempt to achieve a depersonalized objectivity. (1997: 119). 
 
Their paper attracted a number critical comments by Runeson (1997), from Chau et al. (1998) and 
Harriss (1998), followed by a rejoinder to Runeson by Seymour et al. (1998), after which the debate 
ran out of steam. This debate is relevant here because Runeson completely rejected the approach 
advocated by Seymour et al.:  
positivism currently offers the best way to reduce subjectivity and to discipline undisciplined 
researchers and the results, in terms of advancement of science, are nothing short of 
spectacular. Why reject it for something less useful? (1997: 302). 
 
This touches on the core issue in Graham Ive’s approach to methodology. He argues we should 
reject theories whenever for some reason we feel that the aspect of construction we are examining 
does not completely satisfy all the assumptions of a particular theoretical model. We can see this in 
his rejection of neoclassical economic theories in the two important topics discussed in this paper:  
 
 the adoption of innovations in construction as an economic or a technical issue; and  
 microeconomic analysis as it relates to price determination in the market for construction 
management services. 
 
In each case there are widely accepted and tested theories1 that could be used but Ive and Groak 
(1986) in the first case and Gruneberg and Ive (2000) in the second reject them in favour of an 
alternative theoretical framework. In considering Ive’s approach to these issues we can see the 
strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the positivist and alternative approaches.  
 
 
Its the Firm not the Project 
 
Graham Ive’s central contribution to our methodological debate was his insistence on the firm as the 
analytical unit in economic theory. This can be seen in Ive and Groak (1986), and in Ive (1990) the 
link between firm strategy and industry structure is explored. It was particularly the case in his books 
with Gruneberg (Ive and Gruneberg 2000, Gruneberg and Ive 2000) although these, like Hildebrandt 
(1974, Hillebrandt and Cannon 1990) and Cassimatis (1969) previously, failed to sway the major part 
of the discipline to follow suit.  
 
                                                     
1
 Any introductory text in Economics will cover price determination and innovation. 
This means that currently, in the greater part of construction economics research, we have a 
phantom industry, made up of individual and totally independent projects and firms do not exist. 
There are exceptions to this, typically when the focus is on longer-term relationships (Smyth and 
Pryke 2008) or on corporate strategy in some form (Runeson and de Valence 2008). The fact is that 
firms exist through time as they undertake projects in sequence, while an individual project is a 
passing phenomena undertaken by a temporary team. Bröchner (2011) argued for construction 
economics to become more engaged with theories of industry economics and to recognise that it is 
not projects but individuals and firms that maximise utility and profits, and respond to incentives. 
 
In part, this failure to convince the discipline about the importance and existence of firms was 
probably self-inflicted. Rather than demonstrating how the mainstream neo-classical theories could 
be used, even in situations where the assumptions did not seem to fit the reality of the construction 
industry, Ive and his collaborators introduced alternative theories whenever they encountered 
differences between the theoretical model and reality. From the positivist viewpoint the selection of 
theories depends on the question we ask, not on how closely the reality appears to match the 
assumptions of the theories, and there have to be strong reasons to reject a theory that in other 
contexts provides answers to our questions. However: 
Our approach, by contrast, is to start by making a model of the actual processes by which 
economic actors arrive at their decision – in terms which we hope will be recognised by 
practitioners as capturing certain (inevitably, not all) interesting or significant parts of that 
process. …. 
The substantive content of our theory is to an extent eclectic, formed by taking and melding 
together, magpie-like, whatever catches our interest from a diverse range of sources. (Ive and 
Gruneberg 2000: xxiii) 
 
The theories Ive and his collaborators have sought out frequently answer interesting questions, but 
the variety can make their works on microeconomics read more like an inventory of theories from 
sociology, psychology and institutional economics than an integrated framework for research into 
the economics of building. This of course, Ive would say, reflects the characteristics and nature of 
the industry we are studying.  
 
Acceptance of multiple research programmes in the same field was one of the main ideas proposed 
by Lakatos (1977), with the merit of each one judged on how well it points to future (science) 
research and how well it explains or predicts real phenomena. Chau et al. (1998) also believed that a 
variety of methodological approaches can be used, in their case for construction research. They 
argue for “methodological pluralism and paradigm diversity” (1998: 103) and that research should 
be judged on the quality of execution and the characteristics of the knowledge gained. 
 
In practice Ive’s argument is strongly against neo-classical economics, for example in chapter 2 of Ive 
and Gruneberg (2000) on the labour market, where capital-labour substitution is denied in favour of 
deskilling labour through specialisation to pay lower wages by contractors. Alternative approaches 
to neoclassical orthodoxy are the hallmark of Ive’s methodological investigations. 
 
Interestingly, the challenge to neoclassical thinking and encouragement of a pluralistic approach has 
been endorsed by many economists since the financial crisis of 2007-09 and the ongoing 
consequences. In particular, the Curriculum Open-access Resources in Economics (CORE) ebook that 
The Institute for New Economic Thinking released in late 2014 was created collaboratively, using 
input from academics, policy makers, professional economists and students in several countries. 
Their internet-based Introduction to Economics course is described as “teaching economics as if the 
last three decades had happened”.2 
 
Also in this context the work of Lawson (1997, 2003) should be mentioned. He argues there has been 
something wrong with academic economics for some time, mainly because of the use of concepts 
widely accepted as fictitious, such as rational expectations, representative agents, two commodity 
worlds and human super-calculators. He believes the problem is the reliance on formal methods of 
mathematical deductive modelling; and that there is a basic mismatch between the mathematical 
methods employed and the nature of the social, including economic, phenomena that economists 
seek to illuminate. These methods have also notably failed as predictors of events.  
 
 
Ive on Technology 
 
The paper by Ive and Groak (1986) on technological change included a wide ranging discussion on 
innovation, barriers to development, and the relationships between economic, organisational and 
technical change. There was also a potted history of the Bartlett Production of the Built Environment 
series in the early 1980s and of several decades worth of UK inquiries and reports into the industry. 
They declared their intention as: 
a preliminary attempt to indicate a unified theory of economic and technological change in 
the building industry. It is limited to a consideration of that part of industrial change which 
might be termed “deliberate”, that is, cases where analysis and identification of situations and 
trends has helped form conscious strategies (1986: 115). 
 
                                                     
2
 See The Institute for New Economic Thinking site at http://ineteconomics.org/about and http://core-econ.org/ 
for details. 
Innovation is an area where we have a perfectly good economic theory but where home-made 
theories are flourishing. There is some good research here, based on the idea that innovation is an 
investment that requires not only the technology embedded in the innovation but also the return on 
investment before it is undertaken – although some of this research is spoiled by the use of the 
project as the analytical unit rather than the firm. However the majority of research appears to be 
based on two assumptions: that if the technology is there it should be employed and anyone not 
doing so is either too stupid or old-fashioned to understand their own good. A good example of this 
approach is the publication in 2005 of two volumes by the Australian Cooperative Research Centre 
for Construction Innovation (Brown, Hampson and Brandon 2005) where in 63 chapters on 
innovation, there is no mention of costs, rate of return or profit, or any other economic issue. 
 
In economic theory, innovation is a question of profit. To be implemented, an innovation needs to 
generate additional profit. This has two implications. Firstly, the innovation must reduce costs or 
improve the attractiveness (utility) of the product more than its costs. Secondly, the innovator needs 
sufficient market power to be able to expropriate the extra profit3. One of the characteristics of the 
construction industry is the transfer of intellectual property from tenderers to clients if the 
procurement process includes submission of design ideas, which may not be paid for. Further, as de 
Valence (2010: 57) concludes, “the traditional tendering process used by construction industry 
clients has them typically select on price and not pay for innovation in particular or intellectual 
property in general. This does not allow tenderers to appropriate the benefits of knowledge, thus 
removing the main incentive to innovation.” 
 
As in most other industries there are two kinds of innovations, product and process innovations (see 
Smyth 2010 for examples of both in construction). Product innovations are innovations that improve 
the product itself. With the separation of design from production in most of the industry, very few 
                                                     
3
 This is illustrated by the use of patents which serve to create a monopoly for the innovator to allow him/her 
to recoup the costs of developing the innovation.  
firms have control over the design and therefore lack the market power to expropriate the return 
from any product innovation. With the exception of some of the largest residential developers and a 
few global firms, builders have no market power and are therefore unlikely to benefit from any 
product innovation. They get the description of the product from the architect and just implement 
the design. 
 
Process innovations are somewhat different. They are innovations that reduce the cost of 
production. If the costs of introducing them are reasonable, they may increase profit. However, 
there is a penalty on being the first to introduce a process innovation. While the technology behind 
the innovation may be common property across the industry, there is normally a cost associated 
with transforming it from an idea to an innovation. However, the way the industry operates, once 
someone has developed the principles behind the innovation, it will quickly spread across the 
industry and the only difference between the innovator and the follower is that the second and 
subsequent innovators will get most or all of the benefits of the innovation without paying anything 
for the development. This is referred to as the advantages of being second – all the benefits but 
none of the costs. There are two reasons this is the case: firstly, on-site work is quite easy for 
competitors to observe, and thus copy; and secondly, the subcontractors and workers on a project 
will take their knowledge of the innovation with them when they move on to their next project, 
which will often be run by a different head contractor. This is why firms are sometimes hesitant in 
developing new technologies. Note also that everything in this explanation requires that the 
economic agent is the firm, not the project. 
 
As we have seen, economic theory can explain and predict which of potential innovations will be 
adopted and why. More importantly, it can be used to demonstrate that decision makers in the 
industry are not necessarily old-fashioned if they don’t adopt new technologies. In the same way 
that economic theory removes the incompetence necessary for the errors in costing that are the 
central part of tendering theory, it removes old-fashionedness as an explanation why new 
technologies may not be adopted. In other words, economic theory changes construction managers 
from being incompetent and old-fashioned into being the same as managers in other industries, 
people using competence and rational criteria for their decision making. Economic theory gives us 
modern skilled construction management.  
 
In contrast, Ive and Groak suggest that the distinction between product innovation and process 
innovation makes sense in some manufacturing industries but is less satisfactory for the building 
industry (1986: 116). This is due to a synthesis of process and product (whole buildings) not found in 
manufacturing where the organisation of production is in factories turning out standardised units. 
Their argument is that barriers to technological changes are found in the form of organisation of the 
building process, and the distinctive characteristics of the process such as fragmentation. From their 
analysis they identified three distinct approaches to technological change in the building industry: an 
economic determinism; a technological determinism; and the development of the division of labour 
(1986: 125).  
 
They suggest an economic determinism underlay the UK studies of the 1960s and 1970s, where the 
building industry is seen as a responsive industry that has to wait on effective demand (actual 
contracts) before it knows its workload, organisation or product in terms of timing, location, or 
technology. Therefore technical change will not be instigated by contractors because of the risk 
involved, unless this risk can be reduced by stabilisation of demand (taken to be the role of the 
public sector as client). Ive and Groak were not prepared to: 
reduce the influence of economic conditions on the process of innovation to the single 
variable of “rate of increase in effective demand”, and wish to insist upon the relevance of 
variables which measure industrial structure (concentration ratios, barriers to entry, etc.), 
pricing behaviour, financial structure (gearing and debt ratios, rate of turnover of capital 
employed), cost structure, market conditions, and profitability (at the very least -this list is far 
from exhaustive) (1986: 127). 
 
They were also not willing to reduce questions of technology to the output of R&D activity, nor to 
treat technology as something external and exogenous to the production process of building itself. 
This emphasis on the importance of the building process reoccurs throughout Ive’s work. They also 
believed their study of changes in the division of labour in construction offered possibilities for a 
synthesis of discussion of economic and technological factors, while also emphasising questions of 
social relationships (Pryke 2004). 
 
Ive and Groak’s paper focused on advantages and constraints to innovation in construction, and 
despite being over two decades old, this work captures many of the key features of the discussion 
raised by more recent efforts such as Reichstein et al. (2005), Fairclough (2002), or Slaughter (1998). 
Their interesting and challenging paper concluded:  
We have identified some aspects of analysis of industrial change whose limitations and lack of 
a theory relevant to building activity lead us to argue for a unified economic/technical 
framework founded in the building process. Such a programme would involve studying not 




Price Setting in Construction 
 
It is easy to see that the conventional model of price determination - where marginal cost is equated 
to marginal revenue - doesn’t seem to fit building and construction very well. All projects are 
different and located in different places. The buildings have not yet been built, so no-one actually 
knows what the costs will be. Each contract may account for up to a quarter of the firm’s turn-over, 
making it difficult to determine marginal costs. Transaction costs can be high (Ive and Chang 2007) 
and principal-agent issues are common (Chang and Ive 2007). Finally, the actual process of a single 
sealed tender is not really one we see in the supermarkets where we assume economic theories are 
demonstrated. In fact it is not too far off to say that there is no evident market.   
 
The economic theory of price determination is simple: the market will clear at the quantity and price 
where marginal revenue and marginal costs are equal. However, there are different kinds of markets 
depending on the number of sellers and buyers that compete against each other. We have perfect 
competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, duopoly, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral 
monopolies etc. and the price outcome in each type of market structure is different. However, they 
can all be explained by the same theory simply by changing the auxiliary statements to create 
different models. For perfect competition we have many buyers and many sellers producing 
identical products. For monopolistic competition we have many buyers and many sellers producing 
differentiated products, etc. By keeping the theory but changing the auxiliary statements, we can 
accommodate all of these different markets within the economic theory of price determination.   
 
Some of the new auxiliary statements that are required for economic theory to apply for 
construction economics are fairly standard. Something like 90 per cent of all intermediate 
production are sold through tenders – in most cases before actually produced, so these aspects are 
no problem. Arrow (1959), an eminent economist, referred to this process of tendering as the 
mechanism of price determination when markets change that is implicit in the economic models. 
Most producers also have a limited number of buyers. For most services, and construction 
management is a service, there are differences in quality and quantity, but economic theory can 
accommodate this. The costs of most construction management services are determined by 
aggregating a number of different items just like the cost of a meal in a restaurant.  
 Conceptually, there is no question that economic theory cannot apply although in practice it may be 
necessary to add some auxiliary statement to account for what is presumably a discontinuous 
marginal cost functions, caused by the size of typical projects in relation to the firm. This should be 
no fundamental problem as we already use a discontinuous marginal revenue curve in the model of 
the kinked demand curve (Runeson, 2000). The point is that we do not have to reject a theory just 
because our auxiliary statements do not match reality – we can change our models by changing our 
auxiliary statements until they do. 
 
This is not the view of the post-Keynesians. The term post-Keynesian is used to identify economists 
with an intellectual debt to Keynes who are dissatisfied with orthodox neoclassical theory, and who 
stress the importance of uncertainty and finance in their work. The neoclassical view of the economy 
is one where perfectly informed, rational producers and consumers are linked by markets where 
prices adjust (up and down) smoothly and without friction to bring supply and demand into 
equilibrium. Contrast this view to an industry where consumers (i.e. clients) are forecasting demand 
for their stock of buildings and structures years in the future, with the uncertainty that entails, and 
producers (contractors, subcontractors and suppliers) cannot accurately anticipate demand from 
one year to the next. There is no equilibrium level of output in a project based industry, because 
output is lumpy, there is only the value of work done in any period, which will be different in the 
next period. 
 
Post-Keynesians are interested in understanding the process through which investment, savings, and 
financing decisions are determined in an economy where the future is uncertain, production takes 
time, and the capital stock is not malleable. All factors that are assumed away in the mathematical 
models of neoclassical economists. Further, the capital stock in construction is also very difficult to 
define (Briscoe 2006, de Valence 2001) and measure (Lowe 1990). This is a wider set of changes to 
pricing theory than a few modifications to auxiliary statements will allow. 
 
Clearly, this sort of view of economic decisions will appeal to Ive, with his interest in the processes 
involved in decision-making under uncertainty and his ease with indeterminate rather than 
equilibrium outcomes. His approach is aligned with post-Keynesian economics as both are based on 
inductive theories that explore actual determinants and causal processes involved in pricing 
decisions. Also clearly, this sort of approach is not similar or compatible in any way to the fully 
informed optimising accounts of equilibrium pricing discussed above. Harcourt (2006) is a good 
introduction to the development of post-Keynesian theory. 
 
Post-Keynesian pricing has prices set according to mark-up procedures and varying with costs, but 
not directly with demand, in contrast to the general equilibrium, perfectly competitive price setting 
of neoclassical economics. The fundamental difference between neoclassical and post-Keynesian 
pricing theory is in this emphasis on mark-up procedures and the asymmetrical effects of costs and 
demand upon prices, and it is in these two areas that Gruneberg and Ive (2000, chapters 9 and 10) 
stake out their theory, in their eclectic way. 
 
Gruneberg and Ive echo the theories of important post-Keynesians such as Kalecki (1954) and 
Andrews (1964), who are cited, but also Hall and Hitch (1939) and Means (1972) among others who 
are not. These theories are based on observations about the operations of the firm and attempt to 
represent the real world through their assumptions and claims. For example, Kalecki’s (1954) theory 
emphasises how average costs at the firm level are marked up, but are constrained by factors such 
as union power, sales and promotion activities, the degree of concentration in the market, the level 
of overheads to be covered and the prices of competing products. 
 
Including a range of firm-specific and industry-specific factors in pricing decisions, and the 
subsequent profit margin, is also the aim of Gruneberg and Ive. The link they emphasise is between 
construction firms’ pricing and investment strategies, based on their view that contractors need to 
raise their level of investment to meet the increase in costs of increased output. Gruneberg and Ive 
use a model based on Eichner (1973) and Wood (1975): 
This model will bring together the concepts of pricing, output, finance, profit margins and 
gross operating profits, but it is the inclusion of growth which introduces a dynamic element, 
allowing for change and uncertainty (2000: 201). 
 
The representative firm for post-Keynesians is Eichner's ‘Megacorp’ (1976), a large multiproduct, 
multi-industry firm that sets prices in oligopolistic markets, which is in turn based on Eichner’s (1973) 
model of pricing in a microeconomic model of oligopolistic behaviour. In this model the price-leading 
Megacorp maximises growth subject to institutional constraints such as competition and entry to 
the market. This model is applied by Gruneberg and Ive to the large construction firm to show that, 
following Ive’s (1994) conclusion that large contractors meet their need for operating capital by 
cash-flow balancing or by profit-smoothing, the major contractors adopt strategies consistent with 
low levels of investment, unlike large firms in other industries such as manufacturing. 
 
Another important distinction introduced by Gruneberg and Ive is the difference in pricing behaviour 
between large construction firms and small firms, which they describe as near-firms or micro-firms. 
The large firms are oligopolistic, an important but often overlooked point, but small firms operate 
under conditions that closely resemble those of perfect competition and are “constrained by a 
chronic shortage of operating financial capital” (2000: 225).  
 
Neoclassical theory bases prices on the values of products determined by scarcity or utility, although 
prices may also reflect marginal productivity and marginal costs (assuming perfect competition). 
However, post-Keynesian theory bases prices on the particular situation of a firm. Products have no 
natural or normal prices, they are priced differently by different firms, and quite possibly differently 
by the same firm at different times (for example, across the building cycle). Gruneberg and Ive argue 
the imperative for large main contractors is to maintain sales volume to avoid injections of working 
capital. Prices thus are firm rather than product specific, and each firm will have its own amount of 
capital based on the relationship between its level of output and changes in demand, so Gruneberg 
and Ive argue: 
The price and output decision within a production period is essentially a selection of the gross 
mark-up, in the light of the expected impact of price on output volume and on net operating 
profit. (2000: 216). 
 
The explanation advanced by Gruneberg and Ive is that fixed costs for a production period are 
known, but firms pricing decisions are constrained by the price elasticity of demand. Post-Keynesians 
generally would accept fixed costs are more important in the real world than in economic theory, 
because businesses have difficulty in conceptualising marginal and average cost differences. This 
undermines the assumptions of rising marginal costs and diminishing factor productivities found in 
neoclassical theory, and emphasises Gruneberg and Ive’s view that neoclassical price theory will not 





An eclectic approach to theory allows searching for and choosing the theory thought to be most 
appropriate. For a complex and multi-faceted industry such as building and construction this is an 
attractive approach. Although the outcome can lack consistency, it avoids the need to fit the facts to 
a theoretical framework that may not suit. For Graham Ive that unsuitable theoretical framework is 
neoclassical economics. 
 
The neoclassical explanation of technological change in the building industry was rejected by Ive and 
Groak in favour of one founded on the roles of participants in the building process and their 
contribution to the ‘innovation process’ found in the industry. This was not some random process of 
trial and error but a series of strategic decisions made by both firms and participants, with a strong 
social dimension. 
 
Joan Robinson, a founder of post-Keynesianism, said a complete theory to take the place of 
neoclassical theory “would be only just another box of tricks” (1979: 119). This is perhaps why Ive 
has argued for the right to pick and choose “magpie-like” from a wide range of theories. Like Ive one 
can adopt a horses for courses approach to issues as they come up in order to find the best 
explanation for observed facts (Hamouda and Harcourt 1988). This is a perfectly respectable 
methodological position to take, on the proviso that suitable and rigorous criteria are applied to test 
the quality of the results. 
 
What distinguishes post-Keynesian theory from neoclassical economics is the emphasis on the 
importance of the firm, the foundation of Ive’s methodology. The post-Keynesian theory of mark-up 
pricing sits well within the processes at work inside firms, and is the basis of Ive’s approach to pricing, 
which could be seen as the microfoundations of a theory of construction economics. Also, in 
following Eichner’s approach to the financing requirement of firms, Gruneberg and Ive identified an 
important relationship between the building cycle/market, a contractor’s level of output and the 
need for operating capital. 
 
The writings of Ive and his collaborators show a way towards better research in their emphasis on 
theory and the insistence that for building economics the analytical units are the industry and the 
firm, not the project. This is reflected in Ive’s concern that the processes involved in building, or 
more precisely organising the production of buildings, should be seen as a distinctive and defining 
element of our analysis of the industry. Together with this, the willingness to manipulate the 
auxiliary statements of theories so that the models we use matches the essential aspects of the 
industry we are examining gives us the best assurance of finding a robust methodology in our 
discipline. This is an approach also favoured by Chau et al. (1998) in their advocacy of 
methodological pluralism in construction research. 
 
A wide range of economists now argue for rejection of neoclassical economic methodology, and it 
may be that construction economists are part of a wider community of economists outside the 
orthodox mainstream. Graham Ive certainly is a member of that community. This review of his 
research on innovation and price determination in the building industry shows that many of his 
findings are important, and are buttressed by a wider literature than he often cites, and will 
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